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### Thesis & Impact---DROPPED---1NC

#### Restrictions of the political economy preclude the useless expenditure of the general economy, which is necessary to avoid the build-up of social energy guaranteeing catastrophes in ethics through nuclear war and climate change.

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General Economy

On a global scale, as Bataille says, there is no growth, “but only a luxurious squandering of energy in every form.”7 Restricted economies attempt to appropriate its flows and subordinate them to particular finite ends, from mere physical survival to the creation of new markets, but, after all, “beyond our immediate ends, man’s activity in fact pursues the useless and infinite fulfillment of the universe.”8 There is always a limit of growth, and an excess that must be spent this or that way. This excess is called “the accursed share.” The more we produce, the more we need to waste. If every surplus is invested in further growth of the system, like capital, a catastrophic outcome is just a matter of time. Warfare is an example of such an outcome: the prospect of nuclear war, in particular, was a matter of concern for Bataille and his contemporaries.

Be like the sun!

A superabundance of energy comes from the sun: “solar energy is the source of life’s exuberant development. The origin and essence of our wealth are given in the radiation of the sun, which dispenses energy – wealth – without any return. The sun gives without ever receiving.”9 Be like the sun! – this is basically Bataille’s motto for the possible future of the political economy adjusted to the planetary scale and balanced with the ecological whole. If we want our economies to be commensurate with our environments, we have to become solar. Bataille’s general economy is paradoxically rational: what it suggests is that we recognize the limits of growth and think through strategies of nonproductive expenditure as self-conscious activity. We should stop being greedy and stop striving for individual growth, which results in planetary energy restoring its balance in an uncontrolled and catastrophic way. Nonproductive expenditure must be taken seriously and organized as an economy of gifts without reciprocation – a glorious economy.

In The Accursed Share, Bataille tackles historical practices and traditions that represent different approaches to the problem of excess and the ways of dealing with it: sacrifices made by the Aztecs, potlach rituals, Islam, Lamaism, capitalism and bourgeois society, the Soviet system and the American initiative of the Marshall plan. Are there examples of the general economy in the sense that he implements when he connects it to the laws of the universe? Not really. There is always something wrong with the ways in which we interpret gifts. One would expect the last case analyzed by Bataille in his book – the Marshall plan – to be painted as a perspective solution, as it relates to the distribution of excessive American wealth among European countries devastated by World War Two. However, as Bataille emphasizes, even this is a Western political project, created in opposition to the Soviet Union, and considered by its proponents as an investment in the future of capitalism.

The general economy as self-conscious activity is something different, for what Bataille means by self-consciousness basically equates to sovereignty. It cannot be an investment, but only pure expenditure. Self-consciousness, in his interpretation, “has nothing as its object,”10 meaning that it does not want to increase its resources, does not strive to grow and prosper. Self-consciousness goes beyond the limits of the individual; its point of view is not that of the living organism seeking out where to get more stuff, but that of the planetary whole. The transition from consciousness of the individual, determined by needs and interests, to the generous self-consciousness is finally identified by Bataille as the last act of the transition “from animal to man.”11

This claim, which he immediately tries to detach from teleology (from the idea of the final goal of historical humanity, the achievement of which, according to Alexander Kojeve, would coincide with the end of history), today sounds obscenely anthropocentric, but let us take a closer look at it. Bataille’s generalization of all living organisms that behave in accordance with either their natural needs or their private interests as animals echoes Hegel’s description of economic estrangement and the division of labor given in the chapter of his Phenomenology of Spirit beautifully titled “The Spiritual Kingdom of Animals and Deception; or the Crux of the Matter (die Sache selbst),”12 where Hegel explains that individuals, indeed, do think that they are pursuing their private interests – for instance, when they sell commodities that they produce and try to cheat on each other – but this is only an illusion. In fact, without realizing it, these people contribute to the development of the overall economic structure. Bataille’s point, however, is different: yes, individuals pursue their interests, just like other animals that search for food when they are hungry, and entire national economic systems, too, can be compared to such egotistic individuals, but even if they think that they are struggling for universal prosperity, they actually contribute to overall planetary destruction.

This thesis finds endorsement in today’s ecological issues: technogenic catastrophes, air and water pollution, or the difficult problem of waste are nothing more than the effects of dizzying eco- nomic growth rates. In this sense, the transition from individual to human will be the change of perspective, taking the side of the general, solar, or cosmic, that is, paradoxically, of the nonhuman. The question rises though: where should we get the resources for such generosity? Bataille’s response would be that we are always already inherently solar. As planetary beings, we have our moments of “glory” – from something as kind and innocent as sharing, caring, and giving gifts, through arts, play, and self-abandonment of eroticism, to the most violent destructive acts of sacrifice or extermination. We rationalize these lavish acts (for instance, we make sacrifices in order to gain the favor of gods, or exterminate certain animal species for epidemiological reasons, for the sake of a healthier humanity), and thus try to inscribe them within the logic of restricted economies, but in fact we unconsciously follow general cosmic laws of excessively squandering energy and wealth.

Wombats and ethics

I do think, however, that Bataille’s account in The Accursed Share of animals as restricted individuals is not fully thought through: there are reasons for believing that the inherent solarity that he relates to self-consciousness is indeed animal, if we treat animals not as individuals but first and foremost as collective beings. From my perspective, animality is a way of existence beyond the individual; it is a form of primordial togetherness that can provide us with alternative models of the common. We are still not able to estimate the extent to which animals dance, sing, play; to give proper respect to their plasticity, enthusiasm, or wisdom.

Think of the wombats that, during the devastating Australian bushfire season in 2019–20, saved the lives of many other smaller animals by sheltering them in their large and complex burrows. There was a hell on Earth: more than a billion living creatures were wiped out by fire, but not the ones that managed to hide underneath the ground. When news about the incredible kindness of wombats rescuing other animals begun to circulate, scientists hurriedly came up with explanations that the wombats didn’t do so intentionally, but only by chance: these large mammals usually dig multiple spacious burrows, and while they are sleeping in just one of them, others may incidentally become hide-outs for the surrounding wildlife.13 Why was it so important, for natural scientists, to articulate the idea that the Australian wombats did not really exhibit altruism, solidarity, and care for neighboring species, but only instinctual behavior? Because solidarity and altruism fall within the domain of morality to which, according to our scientific policy, animals remain alien.

What if, however, opening their burrows up to other residents of the burning bush, wombats are expressing something that cannot be understood within the framework of Darwinian biology, which sees animals as primitive egoistic individuals struggling for survival? What if altruism and solidarity are precisely those forms of behavior that we cheaply label as instinctual? What if animals do not really need morals and other forms of mediation, because their relation to their territories is different from the private property with which human beings are so obsessed? As famous Russian anarchist Piotr Kropotkin demonstrated in his book Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902), the struggle for survival is not the only one, and not even the main force of the development of life on Earth: various species survive because they cooperate, communicate, and help each other.14 Today’s ecological thinking discovers this new possible way of addressing nature. Thus, Timothy Morton’s call for solidarity with “nonhuman people” presumes that solidarity is not something specifically human, but “the default affective environment of the top layers of the Earth’s crust.”15 In Imre Szeman’s framing, solarity is “a form of solidarity that always already attends to the non-human and the Earth, to the lightness of limits and the depth of responsibility that comes when we tarry with the infinite.”16

Coming back to Bataille’s perspective, I suggest that the wombat-like generosity can be regarded as a kind of underdeveloped part of human animality, a properly solar, or cosmic, part repressed by our restricted economies that constitute us as Darwinian individuals greedy for resources, struggling for survival, and tending to grow. This greed is not so much real animal hunger, as it is projected onto animals that could equally be described in opposite terms, in the language of the general, or solar economy. Wombats do not need an ethical turn to share their living facilities with mice and lizards. Applying Bataille’s theory of animality as immanence, I suggest that, for the wombat, the act of sharing is not “good,” but rather indifferent, not unlike a wolf eating a calf. I am not sure though whether “indifferent” is the right word. I would say that an animal can be equally enthusiastic in a violent act of killing as in generosity of caring. What human animals do is make ethical judgments about which acts are good, and which are evil. In order to be like wombats, we need a complex mediation of self-consciousness that implies a radical ethical turn: “Changing from the perspectives of restrictive economy to those of general economy actually accomplishes a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking – and of ethics.”17

Elevated into a self-conscious human strategy, which takes the indifferent generosity of the sun as its model and transforms it into a new ethics with regard to the ecological whole, this economy becomes the economy of gift as opposed to one of exchange. It privileges consumption over production and expenditure over accumulation. Allan Stoekl, who explores Bataille’s theory for the twenty-first century, addresses the general economy as an ethical turn in the following way:

Not nuclear war, but the channeling of excess in ways that ensure survival so that more excess can be thrown off. And (one can continue along these lines) not generalized ecocide, but an affirmation of another energy, another religion, another waste, entailing not so much a steady state sustainability (with what stable referent? Man?) but instead a postsustainable state in which we labor in order to expend, not conserve.18

Importantly in this regard, Stoekl makes a distinction between destructive waste and nonproductive expenditure. Contemporary restrictive economies, based on the processes of burning fossil fuels, are in fact economies of waste, that have to be confronted by the general economy: it is time to learn to expend consciously instead of wasting blindly.

How to imagine such a nonrestrictive society? Bataille provides an example of extreme poverty in India contrasted to excessive wealth in the US: “General economy suggests, therefore, as a correct operation, a transfer of American wealth to India without reciprocation.”19 This sounds like a simple, but impossible, solution. Why? Because we are used to thinking about such matters in terms of restricted human economies. We consider social life as consisting of interactions between separate objects, individuals or groups, national states and other units that share their specific needs, interests, or functions; whereas the general economy only comprises the planetary whole and its equilibriums. The capitalist economy, which can only treat nature as a resource, is incompatible with the politics of generosity. Therefore, the reversal of ethics alone is not enough. According to Szeman, Bataille’s Copernican transformation of thinking and ethics from the restricted to the general “necessitates a politics of revolution rather than reform.”20 Bataille himself doesn’t really bring forward any explicit program or strategy for political change. His attitude is the one of an eccentric researcher, who does not have a project but suggests his radical hypothesis about the structure of the universe. I find this hypothesis decent enough to be introduced within our recent context.

### Alternative---1NC

#### The alternative is the general economy. Reject economic concentration in the individual that guarantees institutional deadlock and affirm socially nonproductive statecraft.

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“The Transgressive Economy” in *Statecraft and the Political Economy of Capitalism*. Springer Nature AG. 2023. https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-15971-8

Social media is one of the most salient features of the emerging technological landscape, and as many commentators have noted, the implications for our understanding of human versus nonhuman are many and politically pressing (Bratton, 2016). Social media arouses cheers of an imminent liberation as well as cries of a looming technological doomsday in which new mechanisms of herding, crowd control, and coercion appear to be facilitating a worldwide turn to the far right (Kagan, 2019). Little if any social media activity is regulated by governments, and the firms providing these venues for social interaction do not appear interested (until quite recently) in monitoring and policing behaviors. All of this is now quite well known, and it may change as government regulators reckon with the new monopolistic companies and as concerns about the implications for public trust become more widely understood and, in democracies, get presented to lawmakers. Yet, what still appears unaccounted for is the fact that much of this activity is not designed for production in the classical sense. Considerable energy is given off in the generation of nonproductive expenditure in largely purposeless human and human-technological intercourse. Bataille’s chief concern was that the generation of social power would fall outside of any individual (not to mention government) purview, and the futures that societies would build would risk courting new forms of rule, control, oppression, and ultimately organized violence. For the craft of the state to succeed in countering these risks, it will have to come to terms with the forces and features of Bataille’s general economy, and introduce new vocabularies and analytics of rule capable of reckoning with heterogeneity and excess.

Governing in an Age of Excess

But with the subordination to increase, the being in question loses its autonomy; it subordinates itself to what it will be in the future, owing to the increase of its resources. In reality, the increase should be situated in relation to the moment in which it will resolve into a pure expenditure. (Bataille, 1991, p. 190)

Because so few of Bataille’s interpreters have been credentialed in Political Economy there has not been a systematic attempt to measure up the framework of the general economy in terms of the predominant assumptions held by thinkers in the field (certainly in North America). This is true even in the context of Economic Sociology and critical political economy, to say nothing of mainstream Economics. But there is growing evidence suggesting this situation could soon change. The limitations of the restrictive classical and neoclassical doctrines of political economy are now abundantly clear in light of contemporary dynamics (Stoekl, 2007). As researchers begin to direct their attention to the “sharing economy,” to the “gig economy,” the “algorithmic economy,” the “surveillance economy,” the “new energy and resource economy,” the “A-I and remote intelligence economy,” and the “sustainability economy,” a number of new questions are being placed on the agendas of theorists, educators, public policymakers, industry analysts, and even some political economists (Blythe, 2013). And while political, social, and even cultural aspects continue to be prioritized in analyses of new economic forces—related, for instance, to employment dynamics as economies speed their transition away from fossil fuels—too little attention is paid to the twin dynamics of transfiguration and transference in the context of governing, dynamics that are today so much in evidence as capitalism adapts to seismic technological shifts, as societies approach heretofore unrecognized limits of growth, as nationalist sentiments are aroused through propaganda, as citizens are galvanized in response to exacerbating inequalities and stagnating incomes, and as demands for higher quality education, health, child, and long-term care increase the pressure on existing social systems.

The climate crisis alone appears poised to challenge in fundamental ways the logic of market economics just as counter-globalization pressures re-emerge, producing institutional deadlock in the world’s most technologically advanced economies. It can safely be said that today “the economy” is infiltrating spheres of social life in ways not seen since the early 1970s. Capitalism is rapidly transfiguring politics along new lines within nations on the basis of cities and subnational regions (Moretti, 2013), and globally as energies are transferred into social movements and as new technologies are developed for the purposes of securing societies in the midst of new vulnerabilities. Not least among emerging political challenges are new subject and self-other relations (Brown, 2017) within the context of these spheres as well as poised to soon escape them, constituting wholly new life-processes that are founded on the basis of new efficiency standards required by the liberal creed (Polanyi, 2001). The ease with which these life-processes now expand outward in time and space should itself arouse anxiety and prompt more questioning.

Moreover, in recent years there has been considerable discussion in social and political theory about the de-politicization of many spheres of social, economic, and cultural life in a time of neoliberalism—from the family to the firm, from schools to civic organizations, and from sports to the media on to the suburbs and beyond. Such spheres of life are indeed opened up to new logics of political control once deemed nonor essentially un-political, bearing as they do on individual over collective pursuits, or reflecting proclivities to private capital or interests, or whatever whim of any number of far-fetched human activities (such as extreme sports, reality television, etc.). Bataille’s importance is evident in helping to account for the expansive, unnecessary (that is, non-useful) dynamics of expenditure that the field of Political Economy has yet to recognize as constitutive of politics and social life, and which dispose people to engage in nonproductive social and economic relations while finding some kind of religious inspiration projected out into the future in a growing number of everyday behaviors and actions (De Certeau, 2011). His point is not only that human activity constitutes expansive energy fields of nonproductive power, but that these activities are structured according to existing affirmations of the sacred and profane, the accepted and forbidden. These energy fields and their structured affirmations are properly the concern of statecraft.

### Sustainability---DROPPED---1NR

#### Expenditure beyond restriction is descriptively inevitable. Prescription is key to preclude catastrophe.

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Gil Anidjar, “The destruction of thought” in *Thought: A Philosophical History*. ISBN: 9780429445026.

For Bataille, the universe is spent—a notion that must be read as descriptive and prescriptive. Now, it is true that Bataille ‘discovers’ the limits of the concept (the conceit) of production, the limits of restricted economy, when he first reads Marcel Mauss on the potlatch. From there, his rethinking of economy is soundly grounded and articulated around the notion and the motion of dépense, which, according to my dictionary, designates primarily a spending that is monetary, secondarily, hydraulic, and comes to refer, figuratively, to use (of energy, for example) and more generally to expenditure. But the shift in perspective toward which I signalled earlier was initiated by Bataille in the fuller iteration of his thought, and it was of an altogether different nature, of a different measure. When Bataille writes of changing ‘the perspectives of restrictive economy to those of general economy’, he proposes a change that is meant to accomplish ‘a Copernican transformation: a reversal of thinking [la mise à l’envers de la pensée]’. (1988: 25) Such a drastic reversal is not so much anchored, much less regionally grounded, as it is defined (one might say coloured or marked) by destruction.

Hardly a humanist, Bataille was undoubtedly preoccupied with life on earth. Yet, he decidedly locates this (let us say: restricted) concern in a vaster ‘frame’, which he called ‘the movement of energy on earth’ (1988: 10). Invoking the disciplines he learns from and criticizes (‘from geophysics to political economy, by way of sociology, history and biology’) and acknowledging further that ‘neither psychology nor, in general, philosophy can be considered free of this primary question of economy’, Bataille seeks to articulate a ‘general economy’ whose role he saw as ‘extending the frigid research of the sciences’. Incidentally, this extension brings both subject and object to a specific, illuminating (indeed, incandescent), point. This point, Bataille says, is ‘what inflames’, and brings to ‘ebullition’. More precisely, it brings about a shared ebullition, that is at once individual and general. For ‘the ebullition I consider, which animates the globe, is also my ebullition. Thus, the object of my research cannot be distinguished from the subject at its boiling point’.33 The global, planetary movement of energy may not yet appear in its full destructive force, but it does promise a universal incandescence.

I write ‘universal’ because what Bataille is asking us to ‘recognize in the economy’ (understood, for now, in its restricted sense) is only ‘a particular aspect of terrestrial activity regarded as a cosmic phenomenon. A movement is produced on the surface of the globe that results from the circulation of energy at this point in the universe’ (1988: 20–21; emphasis added). Engaged in action and production, and in consumption too, human beings remain provincial, regional, ignorant of this much larger ‘determination’, of the ‘general determination of energy circulating in the biosphere’ (1988: 21). They ‘disregard … the material basis of [their] life’ and fail to recognize in their flurry of activity and productivity that they are pursuing nothing else than ‘the useless and infinite fulfilment of the universe’.

Now, as numerous commentators have pointed out, Bataille’s energetic account foregrounds excess. 34 The endless energy expended by the universe cannot be contained, it cannot be exclusively used (for growth or any other purpose). Nor can it be absorbed, much less conserved (recall Benjamin’s Gewalt): ‘it must necessarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically’. There is, in other words, a limit to growth and to production, to a productive or creative outlook. Excess, or surplus, ‘must be dissipated through deficit operations: The final dissipation cannot fail to carry out the movement that animates terrestrial energy’ (1988: 22). Bataille thus insists that the perspective he adopts (the perspective that must be adopted toward a general economy, toward an understanding of human action and production) is global and general, planetary and even cosmic. As Michael Lewis aptly writes, ‘Bataille directs our thinking to the cosmos, a cosmos in which we may think of the death of the sun and the incineration of the earth and its archives in the context of a profusion of suns, in a process of general explosion and extinction’ (2017: 274). But the economy, Bataille laments, ‘is never considered in general. The human mind reduces operations, in science as in life, to an entity based on typical particular systems (organisms or enterprises)’ (1988: 22). Surprisingly, in The Accursed Share, Bataille himself does not remain for very long at the cosmic, which is to say, universal, level. He too moves toward a particular entity, a regional system. Along with economists and technologists, he turns his attention again and again to the human being, explaining that ‘man is not just the separate being that contends with the living world and with other men for his share of resources. The general movement of exudation (of waste) of living matter impels him, and he cannot stop it’ (1988: 23). The human being thus occupies a strange, or ambiguous, place in this economy. On the one hand, he is ‘at the summit’, endowed with undisputed ‘sovereignty’. On the other hand, this lofty location and function is precisely what ‘identifies him’ with the global movement Bataille has otherwise been describing (the circulation of energy, the movement of exudation). What is clear is that whether they affirm or recognize the final dissipation, the ‘useless consumption’ of which they are unavoidably a part, human beings cannot extricate themselves from it. They can at most ignore or deny it. But their ‘denial does not alter the global movement of energy in the least: The latter cannot accumulate limitlessly in the productive forces; eventually, like a river into the sea, it is bound to escape us and be lost to us’.

#### Ecologically and socially unsustainability. Only the alt solves.

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Onofrio Romano, “Degrowth: The rise of a radical alternative” in *Towards a Society of Degrowth*. Routledge. 2020.

Anti-utilitarians challenge the theoretical approaches that interpret any human action as departing from the pivotal axis of the “individual” and thus oriented towards self-satisfaction:

we qualify as utilitarian any doctrine based on the claim that human subjects are governed by the logic of selfish calculation of pleasures and pains, by their interest only, or by their preferences only; and that this is good because there is no other possible foundation of ethical norms other than the law of happiness for individuals and their communities.

(Caillé, 1989, p. 13)

The object of criticism of anti-utilitarians is an ideological matrix that cuts across thought and the wider culture:

utilitarianism is not a philosophical system or a component among others of the dominant ideology in modern societies. Rather it has become that same ideology; to the point that, for modern people, it is largely incomprehensible and unacceptable what cannot be translated in terms of usefulness and instrumental effectiveness.

(Caillé, 1989, pp. 4–5)

Anti-utilitarians criticize utilitarianism because it reduces the human being. The battle to be waged, they claim, should insist on the recognition of the complexity and the plurality of forms of life. Anti-utilitarianism, far from qualifying itself as anti-modern thought, aims at rediscovering the true meaning of modernity, restoring the scientific spirit against scientism, reason against rationalism, democracy against technocracy. Caillé resumes, in this sense, the Brahmanic classification of man’s goals (purus.ārtha): pleasure (kama), interest (artha), duty (dharma), and dissipative liberation from all aims (moksha) (1989, pp. 89ff.). According to Caillé, utilitarianism has reduced a multiplicity of goals into the sole kingdom of artha. But he also criticizes other schools of thought that translate the ontological multiplicity into one of the three sacrificed motives: the Freudian school devoted to the kama, the holistic school pointing to dharma, or the existentialist mood (à la Bataille) in search of moksa. The counter-project proposed by anti-utilitarians is a contemporary citizenship to all Brahmanic levels of existence, i.e., to all “multiple states of the subject.” This claim is articulated on both an analytical level (the multi-teleology of the human being has an ontological connotation) and, as we shall see later, on a political level.

The second pole of reflection, the social bond, coincides with the reevaluation of gift logic. According to Mauss, the gift is here understood as a “total social fact.” Just like the “underlying unconscious structure” envisioned by Lévi-Strauss, the gift becomes the archetypal performer or the universal symbolic matrix of the alliance between individuals and groups. It acts on a micro-sociological level by the device of the triple obligation – “to give, to receive and to return” – but it can be extended to the meso-sociological scale of the “association” and, finally, to “Politics,” i.e., the macro-sociological frame. “Each one of these three terms – gift, association and politics – is a metaphor, a symbol and a tool for interpreting the others” (Caillé, 1998, p. 236).

In the second half of the 1990s, the political inclination of the movement accentuated, starting from the “thirty theses for a new and universalist left” (discussed in various issues of the Revue du Mauss, starting from 9(1), 1997). On the political side, anti-utilitarianism identifies with the project of “democracy for democracy”: the democratic ideal can be revitalized only by doing away with any aims or interests, especially egotistic, from the collective discussion. According to Caillé, the main obstacle to democracy, and the main reason for the decline of politics, is a lack of alternative social life patterns so that, for instance, even discussion or selection of said preferences is precluded by the utilitarian ideology, leading to depoliticization. Democracy must enhance diversity by offering a variety of lifestyles, increase public space for discussion, and pluralize the possibilities of self-realization. One key proposal in this direction is the basic income, but “radically unconditional.” It is necessary to decouple income from specific social benefits, as this coupling limits the freedom of citizens to experience the irreducible plurality of human aims. Instead, the largest number of citizens possible should have the chance to realize themselves, and to express who they are and what they want to be. Anti-utilitarians call for a “political” critique of boundlessness and excess (Dzimira, 2007). They advocate a political project that metabolizes the principles of “reversibility” – against the externalities of progress that threaten collective existence – and of “reciprocity,” against the power of most developed societies, which limits and threatens the chances for life and action of less developed societies and future generations (Caillé, 2006).

Thanks to Serge Latouche, the so-called anti-pope of MAUSS (given his differences with Caillé) the anti-utilitarian movement produced one of the main strands of degrowth. Latouche (2001) is less indulgent towards Western capitalism, which he approaches mainly through the lens of criticism of development. While Caillé aims to restore the ‘true’ meaning of modernity against its perversions, Latouche pleads for a radical rethinking of modernity, in order to cut off its genetic link with utilitarianism. This path leads to degrowth.

The criticism of growth: ecological and social unsustainability

Beyond the recent economic crisis (started in 2008), the dominant regime – degrowthers claim – produces a much more worrying “ecological” and “social” crisis (Mylondo, 2009; D’Alisa et al., 2014, pp. 6–15).

growth is uneconomic and unjust, it is ecologically unsustainable and it will never be enough. Moreover, growth is likely to be coming to an end as it encounters external and internal limits.

(D’Alisa et al., 2014, p. 6)

The internal limits refer first of all to the fact that growth is an autophagic machine. Technological innovation cannot be unlimited (Gordon, 2012). Saturation of social demand is always lurking, so it is always more difficult to find market outlet for the growing commodities, assuring a constant profit level (Piketty & Goldhammer, 2014). The marginal returns on investment in money and in organizational complexity diminish constantly (Tainter, 2003; Bonaiuti, 2014).

But the external limits are even more worrying. For Latouche the growth regime has to be stigmatized because it jeopardizes life itself: “a radical change is an absolute necessity ... to avoid a brutal and tragic catastrophe” (2007, p. 10). We have to reverse this regime in order to preserve the survival chances of Planet Earth and its inhabitant (Jackson, 2008; Anderson & Bows, 2011; Victor, 2012; Perkins, 2019):

With continuous global growth most planet ecosystem boundaries will be surpassed. There is a strong and direct correlation between GDP and the carbon emissions that change the climate. Global carbon intensity (C/$) by 2050 should be 20–130 times lower than today, when the reduction from 1980 to 2007 was just 23 per cent.

(D’Alisa et al., 2014, p. 7)

Considering that, as a rule, human activity transforms energy and materials of low entropy in waste and pollution with high entropy (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971, 2014), a regime of unlimited growth becomes incompatible with the available nonrenewable resources, with the regeneration speed of the biosphere and of renewable resources (Bonaiuti, 2011).

Many trust in “dematerialization” of the economy and technological progress (going towards cleaner solutions) to reduce the impact on environmental balance. But, normally efficiency, while reducing risks and costs, makes resources more affordable, so it ends up boosting consumption and thus putting a strain on the carrying capacity of the planet (Inglehart, 1990, 1997). This is what the Jevons’s paradox tells us.

Furthermore, dematerialization via the “service economy” is often an illusionism, because it is only the tip of the iceberg, i.e., the final form of a heavy process that embodies a big amount of materials and energy (Odum & Odum, 2001; Schneider, 2008).

Moreover, pollution and waste are mainly poured into the peripheries of the world, engendering environmental injustice (Carmin & Agyeman, 2011; Rodríguez-Labajos et al., 2019; Singh, 2019).

“Social” unsustainability then adds to ecological unsustainability (Kallis, Schneider, & Martinez-Alier, 2010). First, the alleged well-being produced by the growth regime is “unmasked” as the fruit of illusionism. If from GDP – as it must be done – we deduct noxious products directly linked to the externalities of growth (costs of pollution, healthcare, prisons, etc.) we will discover its negative progression in all Western countries over the last decades (Matthey, 2010).

In general, growth ideology assumes a direct correlation between an increase in GDP and collective happiness. According to degrowthers, on the contrary, there is an explicit inverse correlation between well-being and material wealth. The pursuit of personal richness determines the degradation of social environment; thus, the increase of well-having will always lead to a decrease of well-being. The GDP growth, Latouche warns us, produces unhappiness and weakens social relations. Well-having decreases well-being.

Growth is uneconomic because, at least in developed economies, “illth” increases faster than wealth. The costs of growth include bad psychological health, long working hours, congestion and pollution. GDP counts costs, such as the building of a prison or the clean-up of a river, as benefits. As a result, GDP may still increase, but in most developed economies welfare indicators such as the Genuine Progress Index or the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare have stagnated after the 1970s. Above a certain level of national income, it is equality and not growth that improves social well-being.

(D’Alisa et al., 2014, p. 6)

In fact, as the ecological economists have shown, beyond a certain threshold the GDP growth starts to increase much more than wealth (Daly, 1996). Kubiszewski et al. (2013), by collecting data from 17 countries in the period 1950–2003, assert that beyond US$7,000 of GDP/capita the GPI/capita – i.e., the Genuine Progress Indicator (Daly & Cobb, 1989), which takes into account the depreciation of community capital in the calculation of the welfare produced by economic activity – does not increase anymore. At that point, social welfare could only be improved by equality and not by growth (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). On the contrary, growth tends to increase inequalities and social injustice. And this is also due to the “social limits to growth” (Hirsch, 1978). Moreover, the general process of commodification (Gómez-Baggethun, 2014) promoted by growth implies the constant erosion of the precious nonutilitarian dimensions of the human being (Caillé, 1989).

Care, hospitality, love, public duty, nature conservation, spiritual contemplation; traditionally, these relations or ‘services’ did not obey a logic of personal profit. Nowadays they increasingly become objects of market exchange, valued and paid for in the formal GDP economy. Profit motivations crowd out moral or altruistic behaviours and social wellbeing diminishes as a result.

(D’Alisa et al., 2015, p. 6)

### Framework---Expenditure DA---2NC

#### 1. EXPENDITURE: You should sidebar consequentialist analysis. Restricted economies arbitrarily limit the politics of labor to “possibility” when communicative acts provide you with the potential to radicalize expenditure in favor of unthinkable social arrangements.

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Joey Hornsby. “The work of the impossible: reading transgression through labour in Georges Bataille” King’s College, London. March 2021. https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/159766551/2021\_Hornsby\_Joey\_1275321\_ethesis.pdf

The idea of revolution as an event without cause or (planned) consequences raises questions of political and historical agency, and of precisely how revolution comes about. How do the circumstances that facilitate it fall into place, and what are we to do while awaiting them, if we cannot plan for them? These are questions that have been at stake for centuries of political revolutionary thought. There is, furthermore, the question of how we define political ‘revolution’. Bataille’s account as an abandonment of ends leaves the political spectrum wide open; this raises the issue of what is in fact at stake in the movement of the unproductive and the politics of the impossible. And the analogy between revolution and the gift, or the gift economy, raises its own questions; as Still points out, there is a kind of decidedly untransgressive ‘gifting’ or self-sacrifice latent in a market economy, in unpaid work, such as the kind of ‘women’s work’ we have previously discussed. That economy, then, incorporates an element of ‘female self-sacrifice’; we will need to disentangle how this labour sits within general economy, to establish whether that economy, like classical economic models, is flawed in assuming ‘a homogeneity of labour’.226 But, as she stipulates, there may still be positive aspects of gift-giving to valorise, and this jump into the dark of an anti-teleological, unproductive politics requires a willingness to accept future blindness which only the masses, confronted with what they have already lost, are willing to countenance. No real transformation is possible without this; we will remain always within the limits of the known and the possible.

The ultimate possibility of political transformation, Benjamin writes, expressed in the moment of Jetztzeit, is ‘redemption’. This word, insofar as it implies the settlement of a debt or the making good of a promise, might seem to bring us back to exchange, to Nietzsche’s petty slave bearing a grudge, wanting an eye for an eye. But for Benjamin, redemption bears no relation to the ‘closing of accounts’. It is, rather, about the total renewal, the transformation of the lion into innocent child, that would be brought about by a biblical, Messianic Second Coming. It is not about a return to a previous state of things, or achieving a state of equilibrium, nor is it a development of the present; it is the heralding of the absolutely new (and not its mere appearance).227 There is no possible righting of historical wrongs – the ‘shopkeeper’s scales of justice’, as Comay calls them, are beyond redress.228 The ‘wreckage’ the angel sees is irrevocable – for redemption to be fulfilled, that wreckage must be not corrected but entirely absolved, the scales must be destroyed.229

As Benjamin remarks in the Arcades Project, progress in the sense of actual change ‘has its seat not in the continuity of elapsing time but in its interferences – where the truly new makes itself felt for the first time, with the sobriety of dawn.’230 Progress, on Benjamin’s understanding, is not the ‘signature of historical process as a whole’ but the character of these transformative moments with which that whole is interspersed.231 Sovereignty and communication as per Bataille’s descriptions, if achieved on a collective, historical scale, might constitute just such moments. And indeed, the moment of ‘redemption’ could be read as the ultimate gratuitous moment of luxurious wastage, the entirety of human history spent and lost in society’s transformation. The subject of an impossible politics would be the subject committed to a present moment of sacrificial freedom, a moment which becomes impossible ‘dès qu’il est soucieux du temps à venir.’232 And communication might instigate a sovereign community of sacrifice, in which we would mutually embrace expenditure on the scale of the universe, transgressing the restricted economy of the individual which necessitates the compartmentalisation of persons as subjects (and objects) of exchange. In this sense, writes Besnier, the premise of the ‘revolutionary’ as something ‘political’ is in fact the pretext to something even grander, to ‘l’exaltation collective susceptible de cristalliser dans l’instant la continuité qui solidarise l’humanité’. 233 By collapsing the narrative limits of the project, labour and work, and setting in motion through the gift and sacrifice a mise en jeu of the self and the very boundaries through which social antagonisms are defined, expenditure as a political and economic principle of an ‘impossible’ politics might open the world up to new and previously unthinkable social and conceptual configurations, breaking open what Hollier calls the ‘monisme’ of rational thought.234

### Framework---Static Identities DA---2NC

#### 3. STATIC IDENTITIES DA: Communication over distinct political ontologies requires open analysis, not closed plan-focus. Refusing to problematize static identities in favor of “predictability” completely collapses community formations in favor of MSU’s egoism.

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Zeliha Dişci. “Emancipation in Capitalist Society: Sovereignty as Renunciation and Expenditure in the Thought of George Bataille” Kilikya Journal of Philosophy, Year 2020, Volume , Issue 2, 92 - 109, 15.10.2020. https://dergipark.org.tr/en/pub/kilikya/issue/57313/812306

The experience of problematizing existence is sovereignty as revolt. The sovereign person violates the prohibitions of society. It does not serve the economy of meaning, the limited economy, and problematizes the present services. The rebellion begins when human undertakes to break them in favor of his own relatives, fellows. Riot as a refusal to submit to subjugation is a negation. (Bataille, 2015, s. 252) The rebellious is someone who has taken his share of sovereign glory and pushed the rebellion to its extreme limit. He freely reaches the world by self-conducting so as not to be a fool or a slave. The rebellion is the limit of what is possible. (Bataille, 1991a, s. 253) According to Bataille, sovereignty as going to the extreme/end is only possible with ignorance or unknowledge as the denial of another authority and his own becoming an authority. Rebellious reveals itself exactly by going towards the unknown, without deceiving. For Bataille, it is the unknown parts that reinforce slavery, provide great authority to God, or the experiment of poetry. But eventually, it requires an unknown, indivisible power. (Bataille, 2015, s. 27) The sovereignty that interrupts the given because it goes to the limit of what is possible is positioned on the outside of knowledge. Because knowing is always to try hard and to work. It is a slave-spirited action. Information is never sovereign, as it always moves again and starts all over again. (Bataille, 1991a, s. 202) However, we do not have the information on the sovereign moment. As soon as we know anything about it, the movement comes to a stopping point. (Bataille, 1991a, s. 202) Existential problems fall under the field of ignorance in the face of information that responds to the material needs of human life. Human being exists where knowledge ends. (Bataille, 2015, s. 8) The area of ignorance is the domain of sovereignty. Someone who knows before cannot go beyond a known horizon. (Bataille, 2015, s. 9) Thus, sovereignty as contacting with ignorance is to go beyond what is given. Sovereign has a world that extends the given world. One has this different world by pushing intellectual limits. (Bataille, 2011, s. 114)

The sovereignty that does not serve for knowledge, science, and dogma is an inner experience. Human encounters an extreme phenomenon in his ordinary daily life and gets clues about what his existence is. (Bataille, 2015, s. 7) In the inner experience, where all authorities are rejected, the experience itself is the authority. The experience is the problematization of given authority, the destruction of structures. The destruction of the structure is the emergence of non-perfect, the becoming visible of deficiency in human life. The assumed unity or fusion is what is destroyed at first. The experience in which unity is dissolved is only to exist, to get rid of deception and ties. (Bataille, 2015, s. 34)

For the inner experience, the discourse that represents knowledge must stop and silence is based on ignorance must begin. (Bataille, 2015, s. 12) The moment of sovereignty as an inner experience can only be achieved from the most internal motions. Sovereignty as an objection is the emancipation of the power of words. The life that does not go to the extreme and escapes from the end is a life without freedom. It is frozen, stable, and tidy. In this respect, religious, ascetic, or capitalist life is lacking in freedom. They are not a sovereign life. However, freedom is the possibility to reach the very end and the introduction of complementary or profitless action. Freedom for Bataille is not “the freedom of one class over the others, but the freedom of human life against the moral slavery”. (Bataille, 2000, s. 207) It is to go above and beyond the call of duty, that is, social slavery. The human that overcomes social slavery is different from the current human being. The daily human being becomes the same with only one part of human possibility. The human that overcomes the current human being is the whole person who has been freed from his slavery. (Bataille, 2000, s. 208)

Freedom requires a sudden and unpredictable break that cannot be accomplished by premeditation. (Bataille, 2014, s. 43) The amor fati which does not go to the border and submits to destiny is the enemy of freedom. Those who have the potential to go to the very end are the others that are reduced to the body excluded by the soul. The other fragments, distorts. It does not contemplate, it forces fate and goes to pieces. (Bataille, 2015, s. 63) Others, which are not visible from the plane of knowledge and soul, do not exist in this plane. But in reality, they are children, mad, etc. and exist within that plane. Those who are visible are adults, elders, etc. However, those who embody sovereignty are not adults but children, mad persons, and others in general. Because, for example, being a child is to go into extreme, holding the crazy tragedy, not the reality. (Bataille, 2015, s. 65) Sovereignty as going into the extreme becomes the limit experience. The limit is the edge of the world that human knows as human. The possibility of sovereignty is hidden at this point. Here, all knowledge and given bases collapse. The limit experience is deterioration and destruction of benefit, interest, domination and slavery relations between people. (Yalım, 2015, s. 55) In this respect, the limit experience is the experience of immanence. It does not cause satisfaction and does not turn into any information.

### Perm---Bans the Plan---2NC

#### The aff mandates negotiations between employers and employees.

Leahy 18 – Judge, Appellate Court of Maryland.

Andrea Leahy, “Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cty., 236 Md. App. 139,” Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 03-28-2018, No. 788, Lexis.

State labor law also supports the conception that employee health insurance benefits are considered a "term and condition of employment." At the time of Charter § 812's drafting and passage, the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" was already employed in the Maryland Code in the context of collective bargaining. [\*\*\*48] Title 3 of the State Personnel & Pensions Article provided certain State employees the right to bargain collectively—defined as "good faith negotiations by authorized representatives of employees and their employer with the intention of . . . reaching an agreement about wages, [\*174] hours, and other terms and conditions of employment[.]" Maryland Code (1993, 1997 Repl. Vol., 2002 Supp.), State Personnel & Pensions Article ("SP&P"), §§ 3-101, 3-301. See also SP&P § 3-502 (mandating that the matters to be negotiated "shall include all matters relating to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.") Interpreting SP&P § 3-502, the State Labor Relations Board has upheld an administrative law judge's opinion "that employee health insurance benefits are a mandatory subject of bargaining under [this collective bargaining statute]." In re: Md. State Emp. Union, Am. Fed'n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps., Council 92 v. Ehrlich, SLRB ULP Case No. 05-U-01, 2005 WL 6193427, \*1 (March 11, 2005); see also Md. Transp. Auth. v. Md. Transp. Auth. Police Lodge No. 34 of FOP, 420 Md. 141, 159, 21 A.3d 1098 (2011) (holding that an agreement by which officers received take-home vehicles from the State was a proper subject of collective bargaining under SP&P § 3-502 because it concerned wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment).

#### That makes the alt ontologically distinct, banning the plan.

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Konstantinos Kerasovitis, „Necrolabour: A postqualitative contextualisation of contemporary work in respect to the philosophy of Georges Bataille” University of Wolverhampton. 2023. https://wlv.openrepository.com/server/api/core/bitstreams/97f4864a-341a-47c8-bc84-d3c98ede02e1/content

Ontological slide

What matters for Bataille is that work, by introducing division in the species— either seen as between employer/employee, or as in the master/slave dialectic— introduces dehumanisation. For as we have discussed, slavery exists only when we are confronted with slaves, things as property. An ontology that was not present now appears. This does not dehumanise only the labourer, but the master is also alienated from humanity. The master is liable to fall into thinghood: “even if he is still a man for others, he is now in a world where a man can be merely a thing” (AS1, p. 56).

### Perm---No Perms---2NC

#### 1. If we win framework, no perms. Rethinking economics is a prerequisite to ethical labor politics.

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Allan Stoekl. “Reflections on Acéphale” Religious Studies Review, vol. 48, issue 1. March 22. https://doi.org/10.1111/rsr.15740

The ethical issue is, then, to rethink economic systems in such a way that they provide for the safe expenditure of wealth that cannot be reincorporated within the system. The burn-off has to take place rationally, with a self-consciousness not available to Tibetan monks. And the rational burn-off is, ironically, fully irrational: it cannot be disguised as a practical contribution to God’s reign or to some political certainty. Today we could reframe the discussion and turn from the horrors of nuclear war to ecological degradation, global climate change, and so on. As with the nuclear buildup, the current ecological crisis—at least as scary as the prospect of nuclear war, if not more so—results not from “waste,” but from the inability properly to conceive of waste in a system that mandates continuous reinvestment and infinite growth. In such a system there will always be too much stuff, and since it cannot be reincorporated, or effectively reinvested, it will be “discarded,” thrown “away.” There is, however, no “away." The finitude is not simply of supply—solar energy in principle could replace fossil fuels—but of the system itself, which cannot reabsorb the unincorporable excess. The biosphere itself is limited, not just by the availability of resources, but by its ability to absorb the “waste” produced by the wrong kind of consumption. And the wrong kind of consumption (and economic system) ultimately will mean that resources are indeed limited, finite (as in the fossil fuel regime inseparable from capitalism), rather than in joyous overabundance. The finitude of resources, in other words, is largely a function of an economic system that cannot properly grasp the true nature of economic, and biological, excess.

This is a serious political project, but one not at all separable from the Acéphale “fad.” If equalizing wealth means that people just have a lot more stuff to “consume,” then the problem of the unrecognized or unrecognizable excess will remain unaddressed. Society will choke on ever more “waste.” For Bataille, the worker was not just the possessor of a “belly to fill”; he or she had (and was) an excess to burn off (1988, 190). Labor is not necessarily just about reinvestment and production: it is inseparable from idleness, from meditation, from erotic ritual. What does one meditate on? On that ultimate consumer of excess, and of oneself: death. Thus “joy before death,” the great subject of meditation of Bataille. One meditates on the radical finitude of one’s own will, of one’s being. One “sees” in contemplative practice that the larger transcendent goal—God, profit, social status defined through things, national greatness—is absent, that “above” all human activity there is no divinity, no purpose, no immortality, no knowledge that can justify or absolve. One meditates on this nothing, this rien, one incorporates it, and it is the absence of sense that keeps consumption from turning into a socially disastrous waste-production process. “Man will escape from his head like a condemned man escaping from prison,” as the Acéphale dictum has it. Put another way, Man escapes from “Man,” from the imperative to reside in a closed and permanent subjectivity defined by social domination (racism, sexism), the dead-end consumption of capitalism, and the mastery of nature characterized as “other” and as raw material. This death of Man, and of the God he invents and is justified by, is impossibly personified by that headless superman, by the Acéphale.

Just as in Acéphale, then, the project of The Accursed Share is a revolutionary, Nietzschean one, meant to “change the world.” Or (corny as it sounds) save it. The acephalous political conspiracy is not a joke; its reenactment on the scale of global politics is the greatest challenge “humanity” faces. Headlessness is the absence of control, the lack of an overweening subjectivity directing things to effect results, no doubt at a profit. “Progressive” politics as we know them today are all about wealth and prestige equalization—which is necessary, as far as it goes—but not about contesting the very notions of wealth/prestige that are taken for granted in modern societies by all political formations. Wealth cannot really be equalized unless there is some recognition of the fallacies of infinite investment and infinite returns, unless expenditure is reconceived under the sign of the (left-hand) sacred. The conspiracy does not entail an act of will. It is not just about moving wealth around, but rather it challenges the larger uses of wealth and the practices of expenditure. What’s at stake is a social transformation that goes well beyond simple equalization and contentment. The stakes are on the scale of the universe.

### Link---Bargaining---2NC

#### Collective *bargaining* crystallized in a *contract*ual obligation is a shibboleth for the restricted, oligopolistic control of wealth in big employers, which is mutually exclusive with the general economy.

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Grahame Thompson, “Where goes economics and the economies?” *Economy and Society*, vol. 26, number 4. November 1997.

Absence of a single and stable equilibrium

The existence of possible multiple equilibrium or non—stable equilibrium leads to many important implications for economic analysis. It means that ‘history matters' for the new economics in a way that it does not for optimizing perfectly competitive and efficient market models. With the competitively efficient market story all information, for instance, is immediately embodied in economic variables and behaviours. Any new situation (itself ‘exogenously' generated) thus leads to a reoptimizing round, resulting in the rapid movement to a new unique equilibrium. Thus we have a world in which economic agents are assumed continually to re-contract according to changed circumstances, where bygones are always bygones (because past optimizing is ‘instantaneous' and complete), and where the new equilibrium is ‘quickly' established in the face of only the current information. The past does not matter here since it is already embodied in current behaviour, which is itself ‘in equilibrium'.

However, if each new situation requires a bargaining game to be undertaken, which in effect 'strikes a deal' between the parties involved that might be to the advantage of one and the disadvantage of the other, or that locks 'the system' into the wrong technology or wrong product-mix, then you are stuck with this and its consequences through time. The 'choice' of technology or product mix at any particular time has historical consequences that linger. The outcome is thus 'path dependent', dependent upon a series of choices that have been made in the past and that had nothing necessarily to do with the system optimizing or moving towards a well-defined equilibrium. 'Hysteresis' is the term (itself drawn from the 'new' quantum physics) used to characterize this process in economics.

This idea that the outcome of a bargain might lead to different trajectories for the economy has opened up a number of different approaches to thinking and modelling the economy, not all of which are directly linked to game theory models. However, it was the implications of these models, I would argue, that originally (re)stimulated these other approaches. For instance, the realms of complexity and chaos theory do not embody notions of equilibrium or optimization on the part of agents. Complex behaviour of variables is here a product of the endogenous dynamic of those variables themselves, not of an exogenous 'shock' or change in their circumstances. But that behaviour is also highly dependent upon from which values those variables began, again reinforcing the importance of the 'choices' with which the dynamic process originated. A further consequence of these considerations is that biological and evolutionary models now abound in economics. The 'old' mechanical analogies and metaphors that served economics so well (or ill) are rapidly being replaced by 'new' biological and evolutionary ones, which are now slowly threatening to take over the mainstream ground of standard economics. The emphasis is upon 'waves' of optimism and pessimism, leading to bandwagon effects, or herding and stampeding behaviours. The analysis of cycles and switch-points is in again, this time conducted in a non-deterministic world according to non-linear dynamics. Perhaps Keynes' 'animal spirits' could be said to rule once again?

The second set of consequences of the move towards oligopolistic modelling is that 'intervention' in the economy can be justified as a straightforward implication of these models. The usual way intervention is pressed upon the economy (and very reluctantly by economists) is because of 'market failure' issues (by which is meant perfectly competitive market failure, or the existence of 'imper- fections' in one way or another). But with oligopoly the market is 'imperfect' by definition, so the question of imperfections cannot arise in the same way. Oligopoly is the normal result of 'success', and it is to press that success that intervention can be justified. If there are economies of scale as a normal feature of firm or industry organization, and some firms or industries are not operating at their minimum efficient scale, then welfare can be increased by encouraging them to move down their long-run average cost curves towards that minimum. Thus 'protectionism' can in principle be justified by these models, or rather not ruled out by them. And this happens as a normal consequence of market operation, not because of some 'failure' on its part. This is the basis of the policy implications of the new-trade theory.

In connection with the new-growth theory, this stresses the endogenization of technological advance (i.e. explaining it rather than considering it as a consequence of an exogenous time trend), and the existence of external economies of scale (also something stressed by the new-economic geography). External economies of scale imply spillover effects from one decision to others, so that if, for instance, an investment by one firm stimulates economic activity in another then both improve their position. Thus again, in principle, this could justify a subsidy to investment. Such a subsidy can genuinely improve overall welfare if it stimulates external economies of scale to such an extent that these are greater than the cost of the subsidy. These kinds of considerations are now at the heart of economic analysis, not something confined to a marginalized corner of 'market failure'.

Thus there has been something of a sea-change in the nature of economic analysis over the last ten to fifteen years. This is not to say that these changes have completely swept the 'old' economics aside, nor that there has been no opposition to them. They have presented an uncomfortable and problematic challenge to the orthodoxy of neo-classical economics, but they still embody many of its most cherished shibboleths (a production function, for instance).

Econometrics and statistical testing

However, in addition to this, there is great uncertainty among economists over their empirical work. A lot of the developments in theory outlined above have profound implications for empirical verification techniques. Many, for instance, imply non-deterministic and non-linear patterns of economic processes. Such developments have potentially fatal cffects on the validity of normal economet- rics and statistical testing procedures. Economists (along with many others) used to think that they had 'tamed chance', but 'chance' in a stochastic sense is not necessarily the relevant category for biological and evolutionary models of this kind. Probabilistic econometrics is put on the defensive by these developments.

It is here also that the 'rhetorical turn' has taught us something substantial about economic argument, I would suggest. The first major problem for empiri- cal economic work arose in the context of the 'big debate' between Monetarism and Keynesianism that emerged in the 1970s. However much they tried, neither side in this debate could persuade the other side of the validity of their own pet theory. Whatever empirical work was done on these models was not robust enough to persuade the other side to accept its validity. Indeed, each side could more or less use the same empirical raw material, data sets and testing tech- niques to support its own position. This came as a shock to economists! As a result they began to lose confidence in the ability of any econometric work not only to sort out which theoretical position could be substantiated, but also to convince the proponents of a theoretical argument of their own position. Although this produced a flurry of new testing procedures, it undermined the robustness of econometrics generally and produced a new scepticism among economists. This provided an opportunity for those advancing the 'rhetorical' argument to point out, with effect, how all disputes of this type are not just about the 'protocols of science' but also, and often more importantly, about the protocols of a wider form of argumentation in which a range of techniques of persuasion are brought to bear. It also served to provide a much-needed cor- rective on what the actual nature and limits of statistical testing amounted to in economics.

Inasmuch as there has been a general reaction to these problems, I would suggest it can be summed up by the way that conceptions of modelling with 'ideograms' are giving way to conceptions based upon 'diagrams'. Economics has always been a diagrammatically rich discursive apparatus, but it is becoming more so in a newly multidimensional way. The new economics relies more on 'simulations' than does its predecessor. And with computer advances, such simu- lations are increasingly taking a diagrammatic form. Thus almost 'virtual worlds' are being produced within economics, to simulate the operation of markets as complex and chaotic systems for instance (particularly financial markets it must be added). Although these are not yet, so far as I can judge, a true 'virtual reality' - which requires or invites participants to somehow 'take a journey' through such virtual worlds - they are approaching it. As yet they are really used only as scenario-building and exploratory tools. But they are not econometric in form. They are simulatory and diagrammatic.

The new sociology of the economy

The second register in which I want to discuss the changing nature of economic analysis concerns what I designate 'the new sociology of the economy'. Perhaps rather paradoxically, at the same time that oligopoly and the celebration of the big firm is invading orthodox economics, it is the fragmentation of economies and the reappearance of the small and medium-sized firm as an object of study that have appeared in a new sociological approach to the analysis of the economy. The processes concentrated upon here are the horizontal and vertical disintegration (or quasi-disintegration) of the firm: into commodity chains, supply networks, value-added chains and network organizations in general. This has often been summed up in terms of the way 'mass-produc- tion' is giving way to various forms of 'flexible specialization' in production and distribution matters. There are a number of different takes on this process, which I shall discuss below, but it first remains to be said that this (potential) process is not something ignored in orthodox circles either - so it is not con- fined to the heterodox approach. And, second, a number of the techniques and modelling strategies discussed above in relationship to the orthodox approach are being deployed in connection to, or can just as well be used in connection to, the reappearance of these smaller-scale organizational arrangements (e.g. in the case of biological, chaotic and complex systemic behaviour). This point will be addressed below.

The economy of excess

The economy of excess approach is closely tied to the notion of 'post-modernism'. It is a term coined and used by Bataille, Baudrillard and Derrida, among others, to describe a 'general economy' as opposed to a 'restricted economy'. The restricted economy is the economy of utility, the sort of economy described up to now in this paper, concerned with welfare, the good (and 'goods'), happiness, productivity, profitability and so on. 'Utility' is not confined to its individualistic sense in this approach, but is a general category describing anything that celebrates the positively productive. Thus Marx, along with Weber, much of Durkheim and all of conventional economics, is included under this same title.

As opposed to this we have the general economy of excess. This economy concerns itself with the tragic, evil and abandon, with the destruction of wealth, unproductive expenditure, profitless exchange, with ritualistic, sacred and symbolic activity. While the restricted economy concentrates upon the price mechanism and market exchange, the general economy concentrates upon the gift and symbolic exchange. With the restricted economy, economic activity involves well-worked-out and specified contracts, whereas there are no contracts (or, at best, only implicit contracts) within the general economy.

It is in the notion of 'the gift' that the concerns of the general economy most closely abut those of conventional economics and the restricted economy, and the importance of this in the context of the new sociology of the economy is developed below.

### Link---Fed Workers---2NC

#### AND federal labor law renders the state an employer which restricts the self to a citizen-worker.

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Konstantinos Kerasovitis, “Necrolabour: A postqualitative contextualisation of contemporary work in respect to the philosophy of Georges Bataille” University of Wolverhampton. 2023. https://wlv.openrepository.com/server/api/core/bitstreams/97f4864a-341a-47c8-bc84-d3c98ede02e1/content

The self becomes a product to be sold to the potential employer, making unemployment the enterprise of selling the self, as this self is defined by the other.

The State as Factory: Conditionality

Akin to the blurring of the divide between worker and unemployed, there is also a blurring of the divide between state and business. This is most evident in the gradual transformation of the state, from regulator of business, to a business in itself, by the adoption of the New Public Management (NPM) model (Hood, 1991). The subsequent operation of the public sector as a business inherently carries the notions of accountability, measured performance, and competition (Kernaghan, 2000). The services of the state can now be outsourced to the private.

This is indicative of the wider transformation occurring in the nature of the social state. A transformation felt more intensely in the move from passive to active labour market policies (PLMPs and ALMPs, respectively). From income support that does not depend on conditions, to policies that provide support paired with incentives and sanctions (Pissarides, 2011). What is referred to as welfare conditionality, effectively positioning the state as provisor of “public support for private responsibility” (Gilbert, 2015, p. 3).

Welfare conditionality repeats the regard of the world by fiat we earlier encountered in the factory, in the fact that besides the numerous reports (Gielen and Ours, 2014; ESRC, 2018; Dwyer et al., 2020) pointing to its utter ineffectiveness; more actively seeking a job does not make any difference in a market that has no work to offer. Conditionality consistently considers unemployment as an individual failing and not a structural phenomenon.85

The end goal of conditionality seems to be the instalment of a relationship of subordination between citizen and state, not unlike those between employer and employee, master and slave. The worker-citizen is responsible for adhering to the standards of the other.

Support as a right is not on the agenda. A fact which has had a corrosive effect on the very nature of the job of those who are called to enforce conditionality within the state social services: the employment consultants. The very people that form the point of contact between state and unemployed citizen. Consultants are not called upon to act as aides, as the human face of a “feeling state” (Cooper, 2011, p. 3), but now emerge as punishers (see Penz et al., 2017). As managers in the state-factory, they too are workers, and are threatened with sanctions. There is a quantitative demand for measurable efficiency, which makes their work goal “the fulfilment of the performance indicators” (vice managing Director of Vienna’s unemployment services quoted in Penz et al., 2017, p. 550), and not the provision of support.

## Adv 1

### !D---Fungal Pathogens---1NC

#### No fungal pathogens impact.

Pappas and Vrioni 24 – Ph.D., M.D., Head, Institute of Continuing Medical Education of Ioannina; Ph.D., M.D., Professor, Department of Microbiology, Medical School, University of Athens.

Georgios Pappas and Georgia Vrioni, “The Last of Us and the Question of a Fungal Pandemic in Real Life,” Emerging Infectious Diseases Journal, Volume 30, No. 3, March 2024, https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/eid/article/30/3/23-0684\_article

Fortunately, fungi are relatively slow mutators. The process of species-jumping and host adaptation, such as in the case of Ophiocordyceps unilateralis (the prototype for the pathogen in The Last of Us), which adapted from beetle-infecting species to ant fungal pathogen (14), is time consuming and would not be expected to occur over just a few years.

Cordyceps species are ubiquitous: >100 have been described, they are species-specific, and >35 of them perform “mind control” in their hosts. The Cordyceps name is derived both from Ancient Greek and Latin: κορδύλη means truncheon and ceps means head. O. unilateralis, upon infecting an ant, modifies the host’s behavior, leading the ant to move to a specific tree-branch height before it dies; the fungus then destroys the host body and sheds fungal spores (from an ideal height) for further fungal dissemination in the environment.

No vertebrate Cordyceps hosts exist, and an evolutionary path leading there would probably require tens of thousands of years. Other brain-modifying or brain-occupying pathogens do exist, however, such as rabies virus, perhaps the most typical. Human behavior can be modified by pathogens to enable their spread in simpler ways: common cold viruses induce coughing and sneezing, essentially enhancing their own transmission, and similarly, gastrointestinal pathogens change human bowel habits and enable them to spread through diarrhea (15). Further focusing on neural involvement, primary amoebic meningoencephalitis, caused by Naegleria fowleri, might be a more accurate example of a brain-eating pathogen. Bornavirus has in the past been considered a cause of psychiatric disorders (an outcome of brain modification), and the role of toxoplasmosis in the future development of schizophrenia has also been evaluated. Numerous other pathogens can manifest through chronic central nervous system involvement and neuropsychiatric symptomatology, including the fungi Cryptococcus neoformans.

The extraordinary success of The Last of Us has implications, because all depictions of epidemics and infection in film and television can affect public perceptions of infectious diseases and outbreaks (16,17). The video game itself was partly successful because it described a critical dystopia (18) but one that included utopian foci that signify hope and resistance (in contrast to classical dystopias) and act as a pathway to catharsis, an escape from the doom, for the player and, subsequently, the viewer. In addition, the game was scripted with valid scientific details and an openness to moral issues (19): the enemies were not only the infected persons who had become zombies. The Federal Disaster Response Agency was also an enemy, because it represented a totalitarian force that had little to do with public health and protection (admittedly, this is a television show betting on horror and serves as a worst-case scenario and pessimistic study in social psychology). But surviving humans also, at times, became enemies out of desperation or vile evolution (e.g., the Raiders, survivor gangs attacking other uninfected humans for food and supplies). Even the Fireflies, the citizen group fighting the totalitarian state, could be considered an enemy because their mission includes killing the immune child to use her brain to prepare a vaccine. As Erik English recently stated (20), sacrificing a child for the greater societal good represents a broken social contract.

The series is ambitious in its scientific statements to the extent that they align with a compelling narrative. Thus, whereas major scientific issues such as global warming, pandemics, and accelerated mutation and adaptation of pathogens are discussed (things that many viewers with a casual understanding of science will recognize as potential threats even if they do not understand the pathology of fungi), certain details might succumb to the needs of the narrative. The series begins with a televised expert panel discussion in the late 1960s; an expert explains that although humanity has been at constant war with epidemic- and pandemic-causing viruses and bacteria, that war is, eventually, always won, despite casualties and lost battles. However, the same would not be certain if a fungal enemy emerged because of climate change, the expert warns.

Fast forward to the opening of the second episode, which narrates the initial outbreak in Indonesia, describing how the epidemic started in a grain/flour factory, initially infecting persons in contact with infected products but then rapidly disseminating through person-to-person transmission worldwide. This point is where the need of the show runners to impress the viewer diverts from scientific reasoning: apart from the improbably fast dissemination of the nonairborne pathogen worldwide, the series presents an expert Indonesian mycologist who states, when asked what should be done about the outbreak, “Bomb Jakarta,” an awe-inducing statement. Bombing was implied as a means of outbreak containment in the 1995 film Outbreak, considered to be one of the most accurate on-screen depictions of an outbreak (16), but in that scenario, at least, the army proposed it, whereas here it is a scientist’s proposal. One could argue that if Jakarta were bombed in this hypothetical scenario, humanity could have been spared from the apocalypse. However, this statement immediately renders the scientific community useless, possibly indirectly weakening the public’s trust in science itself (or reflecting public worries about the ability of science to respond adequately). Similarly, the fact that the human response to the pandemic eventually led to a totalitarian state (complete with quarantine zones and death penalties) might reflect the audience’s actual fears, particularly in the context of an actual pandemic, in which necessary initial lifesaving measures (e.g., lockdowns) have been vilified by merchants of disinformation. (One could counter-argue that certain approaches to viral containment in China were, or have been presented in the world media as, dystopic). The choice of Jakarta as the origin of the pandemic might feed inaccurate stereotypes that link emerging infectious diseases specifically with the developing world, but southeast Asia has no relevant outbreak history of emerging fungal infections and would not be considered a fungal hot spot. Jakarta could be considered a megacity, however, and as such could contain areas with hygienic challenges that could favor early infection dissemination.

The Last of Us is not the first work of art depicting a postapocalyptic world caused by a Cordyceps species adapted to humans. The 2016 film The Girl With All The Gifts, based on the Mike Carey book of the same title, imagines a world where the pathogen achieves equilibrium with its hosts, resulting in a society that breeds intelligent zombie children (“They had to live with the pathogen, endemicity was unavoidable” echoes the excuses used for our actual pandemic response fatigue). The initial depiction of a human-infecting Cordyceps outbreak, though, was in 2011, in the Fox television series Fringe, in an episode titled Alone in the World. In that episode, a variant of the fungus with the capacity for hyper-accelerated growth and nutrition absorption formed an extended neural network and was eventually contained with a specifically developed toxin (after initial partially successful ultraviolet light attempts).

Eventually, is a fungal pandemic a plausible scenario? Fungi are not included in the World Health Organization prioritization criteria for potential biologic weapon development and use, and other prioritization scores for biologic weapons (21) would yield a low score for fungi. There is no history of rogue research on fungal weaponization; in addition, a narrow spectrum of the population would be vulnerable to such a pathogen, and person-to-person transmission would be limited (we do inhale fungal spores, but we do not exhale them). On the other hand, a fungal pandemic would find humanity ill-prepared. Our diagnostic capacity for fungal pathogens remains extremely limited, no vaccines are available (although preliminary research has been conducted on a Coccidioides vaccine, and a Candida vaccine has been tested in a phase 2 clinical trial of vulvovaginal candidiasis) (22,23), and our therapeutic interventions are limited, costly, and have major side effects. Yet there would be space for preventive use of interventions: would rapid dissemination of antifungal medication be feasible in such a case? And how rapidly would antifungal resistance emerge?

## Adv 2

### Courts Don’t Solve---1NC

#### The court won’t stand up to Trump.

Commander 1/3 – Deputy news editor at Newsweek; quoting former U.S. attorney for Alabama with JD from University of Virginia School of Law

Anna Commander, with quotes from Joyce Vance, “Majority of Supreme Court Justices Have Failed to Show Up: Legal Analyst,” Newsweek, last updated 1-3-2026, https://www.newsweek.com/majority-of-supreme-court-justices-have-failed-to-show-up-legal-analyst-11300945

The majority of justices on the U.S. Supreme Court have failed in rising to the occasion during a critical period in America when their voices are "desperately needed," former federal prosecutor Joyce Vance wrote in her Substack Civil Discourse about Chief Justice John Roberts' year-end report on Friday.

Why It Matters

The 2025 report from Roberts comes at a time when the highest court in the land is under heightened scrutiny due to political pressures from President Donald Trump’s second administration, ongoing concerns about judicial independence and intensified public skepticism toward the court.

What To Know

The 13-page report touched on the history and principles behind judicial independence, including life tenure and salary protections for judges, but avoided direct discussion of contemporary political conflicts involving the federal judiciary. Roberts noted President Calvin Coolidge’s call to “turn for solace” to the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution “amid all the welter of partisan politics.”

Roberts briefly referenced historical events, including the attempted impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase in 1805, which set a precedent for judicial independence free from political retribution. However, direct mention of recent events—like Trump’s public criticisms of lower court rulings and his calls for the impeachment of federal judges—was notably absent.

Vance called out Roberts in her Substack over a picture chosen for the report, which showed an empty room.

"The past decade has made it clear that our institutions are only as strong as the people in them. That makes this photo a startling choice for a report about the judiciary, albeit likely unintentional," Vance said. "But it’s a marker for what has become increasingly clear: that the majority on this Court has failed to show up in a moment when their institutional voice is desperately needed. The Court has been either unwilling or incapable of meeting the challenge to democracy that Donald Trump poses."

### Courts Don’t Solve---1NR

#### Legitimizing the Supreme Court causes a second Lochner Era that cements unchecked corporate domination --- outweighs, turns, and circumvents the case.

Rabin-Havt 20 – former Deputy Campaign Manager and Chief of Staff for the Bernie Sanders for President Campaign, former Deputy Chief of Staff and Senior Advisor to U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders, M.A. in Political Management from The George Washington University

Ari Rabin-Havt, “The Courts Were Always Bad. Now They’re Fundamentally Illegitimate.,” Jacobin, 11-03-2020, https://jacobinmag.com/2020/11/supreme-court-barrett-mcconnell-trump-election/

The confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett will end up putting not only issues such as abortion and LGBT rights at risk, but also the fundamental ability to advance progressive economic goals.

During the forty years of the Lochner era, spanning from the late nineteenth century through 1937, the Supreme Court advanced a deeply regressive view of the Constitution and the definition of freedom, striking down child labor laws, laws protecting organized labor, minimum wage laws, legislation regulating the coal industry, and other important protections. The least democratic branch of government gave itself sweeping powers to invalidate the work of progressive elected officials.

The end of this era only came after Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s late-1930s court-packing threat.

Now, with a 6–3 majority on the Supreme Court that is not only conservative but filled with justices hand-picked by the deeply reactionary Federalist Society, we risk entering a new Lochner era. Almost immediately, the Affordable Care Act will be put at risk. But threats do not end there. This majority on the court could hamstring any efforts to confront the threat of climate change and to challenge monopolies, and it will directly threaten our democracy.

For too long, conservatives have been permitted by the media to make the absurd claim that the court was filled with judicial activists, while the conservative justices were just calling “ball and strikes.” They were the originalists, with a Ouija board that could divine the true intent of the Founding Fathers, whose blessing would be magically bestowed on their decisions.

Over the years, this has led even previous courts to issue some deeply radical decisions. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court overturned a long-held precedent to rule that the Second Amendment gives Americans an individual right to bear arms as opposed to one bestowed on a “well-regulated militia.” This was used to strike down Washington, DC’s handgun ban. But, then as a judge on the DC circuit court, Brett Kavanaugh’s opinion in the case also declared that banning semi-automatic assault rifles would also likely not pass constitutional muster.

In the Citizens United decision, which in and of itself was deeply flawed, Clarence Thomas’s concurrence separates him from the rest of the court, declaring that disclosure of political donations itself is an imposition on free speech rights. This was a lone view in 2010 but could increase in prominence with the current Supreme Court.

The fundamental reality is that, for too long, liberals have been overly invested in the legitimacy of the courts. At the same time, conservative advocates continue to advance completely bad faith arguments, protected by the sheen of the judiciary being above politics.

With the confirmations of Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett, the idea that the Supreme Court has any legitimacy should be verboten among both liberals and leftists. Through Mitch McConnell’s behavior during these confirmations, he has given up any argument for the validity of the institution.

Adding seats, mandating retirements to the lower courts, or enacting jurisdiction-stripping legislation that would reduce the court’s power are not radical moves, they are simply a necessity to prevent the repeal of fundamental rights.

John Roberts, in his time as chief justice, has seemingly been aware that the court risks losing legitimacy and has made every attempt to preserve the institution through a long game of narrowly tailored opinions on issues such as the ACA and DACA that put him at odds with the court’s other conservatives. At the same time, he’s used his power to roll back voting rights in a not-so-transparent attempt to cement Republican majorities.

With Donald Trump threatening legal challenges likely to head to the Supreme Court, Roberts could lead another ruling that seemingly bucks conservatives but is actually designed to strengthen his power to issue more radical and damaging rulings in the future.

It’s not that far-fetched. If, today, Donald Trump is defeated at the ballot box but puts up a fight in the federal courts to maintain the White House, the case will almost certainly end up at the Supreme Court. If Roberts were to put together a majority that ruled against Trump and affirmed Joe Biden’s election, the media will cheer the Supreme Court as once again having the cleansing sheen of being an institution above the day-to-day partisan fights of Washington, DC. Roberts could then use this leverage to stymie any possible progressive legislative priorities. He could go so far as to strike down minimum wage laws, worker protections, environmental regulations, and immigration rules, along with overruling Roe and Obergefell. We could end up pining for the Citizens United era, as large anonymous political contributions given directly to candidates is deemed constitutionally protected speech.

Anyone who accepts the legitimacy of this court is simply writing Samuel Alito, Amy Coney Barrett, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh, John Roberts, and Clarence Thomas a permission slip to repeal every major political gain of the twentieth century and future legislative victories to come.

We should demand a Supreme Court that defers to the will of legislative majorities and upholds rights that enhance our democracy. We’ll need years of struggle, starting now, to get to that point.